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_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 28, 2011 
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Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 






GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
Appellant Alvin Jerome Walton (“Walton”) appeals the District Court‟s Order 
denying his Batson challenges, his Brady challenges, and his motion for a new trial.  
Walton also contends that the District Court‟s jury instructions on aiding and abetting the 
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distribution of cocaine were not appropriate.
1
  On December 5, 2008, Walton was 
sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment, eight years of supervised release, a $1,000 
fine, and a special assessment of $300.  Walton now files this timely appeal.   
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s Order. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and shall recount only the 
essential facts.  On February 24, 2005, a superceding indictment charging Walton with 
one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and two 
counts of distribution of cocaine and aiding and abetting in the distribution of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, was unsealed.
2
  In 
April 2005, the District Court appointed counsel to represent Walton.  A second 
superceding indictment was filed on November 17, 2005, which did not materially alter 
the charges against Walton.
3
    
According to the second superceding indictment, on July 26, 2004, Walton mailed 
two express mail packages (allegedly containing narcotics) to 1810 South Broad Street in 
Philadelphia, PA, from the Timmons Lane Post Office in Houston, Texas.  On July 27, 
                                                 
1
  Walton states eight separate claims in his pro se petition.  The first two claims relate to 
Walton‟s Batson challenge, the next five claims relate to his Brady issues, and the final 
claim relates to the District Court‟s jury instructions.   
 
2
  Two other co-defendants, Anthony Angelo Winfrey and James Bostic, Jr. were charged 
in the superceding indictment. 
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2004, a postal inspector, Yvette Thomas (“Inspector Thomas”) intercepted the express 
mail packages in Philadelphia.  A narcotics detection dog reacted positively to the 
packages.  After securing a search warrant, Inspector Thomas opened and photographed 
the contents of the packages, which also tested positively for cocaine.  Inspector Thomas 
repackaged the packages and arranged a controlled delivery.  As a result of the controlled 
delivery of the packages, Walton was arrested and later indicted. 
During the jury selection process, the government exercised a number of 
peremptory challenges.  Three of the individuals the government struck from the venire 
were minorities, resulting in a venire with no minority jurors.  Walton‟s counsel sought to 
challenge the government‟s exclusion of these three specific jurors, pursuant to Batson.    
During the hearing regarding the Batson challenges, the government provided its reasons 
for exercising a peremptory challenge as to each of the minority jurors it struck.  
Walton‟s counsel argued that in each instance, the stated basis was pretextual.  The 
District Court concluded that the government produced, as is required, “a non-race-based 
explanation” for striking each of the three jurors, and denied Walton‟s Batson challenges.  
(App. Vol. II, Part I, 135).  
On April 11, 2006, Walton proceeded to trial on all counts of the second 
superceding indictment.  After the government presented its case-in-chief, Walton‟s 
counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29.  The District Court 
denied the motion.  The jury found Walton guilty of all charges.  After trial, Walton filed 
a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting prosecutorial misconduct.  The District 
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Court also denied that motion.  On June 12, Walton‟s counsel filed a motion to withdraw 
as counsel, based on irreconcilable differences with his client.  On June 20, 2006, the 
District Court held a hearing with Walton and all counsel present.  The District Court 
granted Walton‟s counsel‟s motion to withdraw, and appointed new counsel to represent 
Walton. 
On November 2, 2006, Walton‟s new counsel filed a motion for a new trial, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a), alleging that the government failed to disclose 
impeachment evidence and failed to preserve exculpatory evidence.  On February 1, 2007 
and June 13, 2007, the District Court conducted a Brady hearing on Walton‟s evidentiary 
issues.   
On July 20, 2007, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order denying 
Walton‟s motion for a new trial and rejecting Walton‟s Brady challenges.4  
Walton was sentenced on December 5, 2008, and filed this timely appeal.  On 
April 23, 2010, Walton‟s counsel filed a brief on appeal.  However, Walton later filed a 
motion to proceed pro se and to withdraw the brief his counsel had filed.  This Court 
granted Walton‟s request and his pro se brief was filed on September 20, 2010.5 
                                                 
4
  The District Court denied Walton‟s Brady claim based on the surveillance videotape 
received by Postal Inspector Thomas, and also rejected Walton‟s claim that the 
government unlawfully failed to preserve the surveillance videotape.  Finally, the District 
Court rejected Walton‟s claim that the government illegally failed to correct Postal 
Inspector Thomas‟s false testimony at trial. 
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 Although this Court received both the pro se brief and the brief from Walton‟s former 




II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over questions of law.  Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 
277 (2001).   “An appellate court ordinarily reviews a district court‟s ruling on a motion 
for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion.  
However, where the motion for a new trial is based on a Brady claim, which presents 
questions of law as well as questions of fact, the appellate court will conduct a de novo 
review of the district court‟s conclusions of law as well as a clearly erroneous review of 
any findings of fact. United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2005).   Batson 
claims are reviewed for clear error.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-66 
(1991).  Because Walton did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we review the 
District Court‟s instructions to the jury for plain error.  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 
245, 265 (3d Cir. 2001). 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Batson Challenges 
 
 The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory 
challenge to strike a prospective juror solely on account of race.”  Coombs v. 
Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2010).   “The same equal protection principles 




that are applied to determine whether there is discrimination in selecting the venire also 
govern the State‟s use of peremptory challenges to strike individual jurors from the petit 
jury.”   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986). 
  In Batson, the Supreme Court held that “the state denies a black defendant equal 
protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his 
race have been purposefully excluded.”  476 U.S. at 85.  “A criminal defendant may 
object to the race-based exclusion of jurors affected through peremptory challenges 
regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded juror share the same race.”  See 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404-16 (1991).
6
 
 A trial court conducts a three part analysis to assess a Batson challenge.  First, the 
defendant has to “establish a prima facie case [of racial discrimination] by demonstrating 
a pattern of peremptory challenges of jurors of a particular race.”  United States v. Milan, 
304 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2002); See also, Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006).  
Second, if discrimination is shown, the government has the burden to “rebut the prima 
facie case by tendering a race-neutral explanation for the strikes.”  Milan, 304 F.3d at 
281.  Third, if the government does present a race-neutral explanation, the defendant 
must then prove purposeful discrimination by showing that the proffered explanation is 
pretextual.  Id.   
                                                 
6 
  See also Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992)(where the court recognized the claim 
of an Hispanic who asserted that the state violated the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment by using peremptory challenges to exclude the 




 In Brady v. State of Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 For a Brady claim to succeed, the petitioner must make three showings: (1) the 
evidence was suppressed; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and 
(3) the suppressed evidence was material to either guilt or punishment.  See Pelullo, 399 
F.3d at  209. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Walton’s Batson Challenges 
 
Walton contends that three peremptory challenges of the government were 
improper, arguing that the government exercised racially motivated peremptory 
challenges during jury selection and that the trial court misapplied the governing standard 
announced by the Supreme Court in Batson, by failing to make required credibility 
findings regarding the government‟s proffered justifications for his peremptory strikes 
during voir dire.  We disagree.   
Walton‟s counsel informed the District Court that there was a Batson challenge, 
based on three of the government‟s peremptory strikes.  After Walton‟s counsel identified 
the three potential jurors who were stricken by the government, the District Court 
reviewed the burden of proof requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination under 
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Batson.   The government then denied that the challenges were based on race and 
proffered race-neutral bases for its challenges.   
The first challenge by Walton‟s counsel was related to Juror 12.  During voir dire, 
the government informed the District Court that it would like to strike Juror 12 for cause, 
after noticing that Juror 12 kept her eyes closed during the proceeding.  The government 
suggested that the District Court ask Juror 12 whether or not she had a problem with 
staying awake.  The District Court agreed, and proceeded to ask Juror 12 a number of 
questions, including whether she was on medication and if so, whether the medication 
induced drowsiness.  Juror 12 responded that she was on allergy medication and 
medication for hypertension.  Juror 12 also stated that she was not dozing, but that her 
eyes were bothering her because of her allergies.  When the District Court inquired as to 
whether Juror 12 would be able to pay attention to the evidence, she answered in the 
affirmative.   The District Court then invited counsel from both sides to ask questions of 
Juror 12.  After they declined to do so, the District Court stated that “She said her eyes 
were bothering her and we are not striking her for cause.”  (App. Vol. II, Part I, 89).  
Later, the government struck Juror 12 by using one of its peremptory challenges.  The 
government stated that Juror 12 was stricken because she had her eyes closed during voir 
dire, and the government thought that she was asleep during the questioning, and that she 
would not pay attention during the trial.  
The second African-American struck by the government was Juror 13, a postal 
service worker.  The government explained that it had stricken Juror 13 because “Yvette 
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Thomas [Inspector Thomas] explained . . . that U.S. Postal Inspectors investigate postal 
employees and we felt like the employees would not necessarily be favorable, but would 
be biased against the Government because they get actually investigated by postal 
inspectors.”  (App. Vol. II, Part I, 133).  The government then pointed out that another 
postal employee, a white male, had also been stricken. 
The next minority juror struck, Juror 21, was not African American.  Indeed, the 
government expressed some surprise when she was described as a Latina by Walton‟s 
counsel.
7
  According to the government, Juror 21was struck because she did not answer 
any questions.  The government stated “[f]rom our observations and from Yvette 
Thomas‟ observations, we did not think she was paying attention to the questions and that 
is why we struck her.  That is the reason why our observations were made and the 
defense struck a lot of people that didn‟t answer any questions.”  Id.  
Walton‟s counsel pointed out that the fact remained that the jury did not have any 
African-Americans on it.  However, the District Court pointed out that “the test is not 
how the jury appears at final selection.  The test is whether the jury panel is drawn in a 
way that assures representation of minorities and there has been no suggestion  . . . that 
there is anything improper about the way in which our juries are selected, our jurors are 
selected.”  (App. Vol. II, Part I, 134).  We agree.   
                                                 
7 
Although Juror 21 is not of the same race as Walton, she is a minority, and is therefore 
included in a Batson analysis.  See Powers, where the Supreme Court held that a white 
criminal defendant had standing to object to, and appeal the exclusion of, black jurors 
through peremptory challenges, even though the defendant and the potential jurors were 
of different races.  499 U.S. at 401.   
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The District Court concluded that the government had come up with a non-race-
based explanation for striking the three minority jurors.  Hence, there was no basis for 
determining that a Batson argument posited by the defense should be sustained.  
Although the District Court did express some disappointment that there was no minority 
representation in the venire, that concern did not sufficiently redound to the detriment of 
Walton to sustain the Batson challenge.   
Next, Walton claims that the District Court omitted Batson‟s third step, i.e., the 
trial court must make a credibility determination regarding whether the explanations 
advanced by the government were pretextual.
8
   We disagree.  The District Court made a 
specific finding, stating that “the Government has come up with a non-race-based 
explanation for the striking of those three jurors.”  (Id. at 135).  This statement indicates 
that the District Court did indeed conduct the third step of the analysis. 
  Walton also contends that the District Court erred by misstating that Batson 
applies only to members of Walton‟s race.  We disagree.  Even though the District Court 
stated that the government exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of 
defendant‟s race, the District Court made several other statements that indicate that all 
minorities are included in the Batson analysis, such as: “there are no African-Americans 
or other minorities on the jury panel that remains.” (Id. at 132).  During the discussion 
                                                 
8
 In his brief, Walton also stated that the government failed to offer a race-neutral 
justification for the challenged strikes.  However, we find that the District Court did make 
a specific finding that the Government had a non-raced-based explanation for the 
challenged strikes.  
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regarding the Batson challenges, the District Court also referred to the three jurors, 
indicating that he was obviously aware that all minorities were included in the Batson 
analysis.   
We find that the District Court‟s misstatement was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 73 (3d Cir. 2002).  An error is harmless if it 
did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict.”  Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 276 (3d Cir. 2008) (where this Court found that 
the government presented such extensive evidence of the defendant‟s guilt that the error 
could not have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury‟s verdict).  (Internal citations omitted).  
Finally, Walton claims that the District Court erred by ruling that Walton had not 
proven purposeful discrimination by the government and that the District Court 
“expressly ruled that Appellant had made a prima facie showing of intentional 
discrimination.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 20).  We disagree.  Walton misquotes the District 
Court‟s statement.  The District Court stated “I think the defendant has made a prima 
facie case accepting the statement that there are no African-Americans or other minorities 
on the jury panel that remains.”  (App. Vol. II, Part I, 135). That is quite different than 
concluding that there is a finding of discrimination by the Court.  The District Court 
never stated or intimated that intentional discrimination was shown.  We find that the 




Walton’s Brady Claims 
 
 Walton‟s next group of claims involves the government‟s failure to produce a 
surveillance videotape from the Timmons Lane Post Office where Walton allegedly 
mailed the packages of cocaine.   Walton contends that the District Court erred by:  
(1)  misapplying the controlling legal standard by ruling that the 
government was not obligated to obtain evidence favorable to the defense; 
(2) ruling that the government‟s failure to disclose impeachment evidence 
favorable to appellant was harmless; 
(3) ruling that the government‟s destruction of evidence did not undermine 
confidence in the jury‟s verdict; 
(4) ruling that the government had not acted in bad faith when it destroyed 
potentially exculpatory evidence; and  
(5) ruling that the government‟s failure to correct knowingly false trial 
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
 (1) The District Court erred by misapplying the controlling legal standard and 
ruling that the government was not obligated to obtain evidence favorable 
to the defense. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the government is required to disclose evidence 
favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or to punishment.  Brady, 73 U.S. at 
87.  The „Brady rule‟ extends to evidence regarding impeachment of witnesses and the 
government‟s obligation to produce to the defense impeachment material.   Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).   In his claim that the District Court misstated 
the Brady rule, Walton misstates the expectation.  “Brady provides that the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused, upon request by the defense, 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.  This rule has been modified 
 
 13 
to require a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence even when there has not been a 
request for the information by the defense.”  United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Walton believes that the government was required to obtain any evidence 
favorable to the defense.  He is mistaken.  The government is required to disclose 
evidence in its possession, favorable to the defense.  Brady does not create an affirmative 
obligation on the government to find evidence that may be exculpatory for defendant‟s 
use.   
(2)  The District Court erred by ruling that the government’s failure to disclose 





Walton argues that the District Court‟s ruling under Giglio that the government‟s 
“failure to disclose” the surveillance tape was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was in 
error.  In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991), the Supreme Court 
recognized a distinction between structural defects, which require reversal, and trial 
errors, which require a reviewing court to engage in harmless error analysis (particularly, 
when Constitutional error exists).  “A trial error is an error which occurred during the 
presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in 
the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 307-08. 
                                                 
9
 See Marshall, 307 F.3d at 74, where an error is harmless if there is no reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.  The 
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
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“Whether . . . an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of 
factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 684 (1986).  In Walton‟s case, these factors include: (1) the importance of the 
videotape to the prosecution‟s case; (2) whether the videotape was cumulative; (3) the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the videotape on material 
points; (4) the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; (5) and the overall 
strength of the prosecution‟s case.  Id.     
There is no way to determine what would have been on the July 26, 2004 
videotape, despite Walton‟s contention that it was impeachment evidence.  Inspector 
Thomas was cross-examined at length by Walton‟s counsel.  The videotape was not 
important to the government‟s case.  The government presented a strong case, with 
overwhelming evidence of Walton‟s guilt, in the absence of the videotape.  That evidence 
included Walton‟s fingerprints on the express mail packaging materials and the 
cellophane-wrapped cocaine, co-defendant Winfrey‟s testimony, and evidence of 
shipping material found in Walton‟s home.     
Inspector Thomas testified that there was no videotape depicting July 26, 2004, the 
date the two packages were mailed to 1819 South Broad Street in Philadelphia, PA.  She 
further testified that the surveillance tape she did have was for June 26, 2004, and that she 
did not notice the erroneous date until much later.    
In its July 20, 2007 Memorandum and Order denying Walton‟s motion for a new 
trial, the District Court found no Brady violation.  The District Court found that the 
 
 15 
government did not have the videotape that Walton considers to be impeachment 
evidence.  We conclude that the error committed by Inspector Thomas in obtaining the 
wrong videotape was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not affect the outcome 
of the trial.  
 (3) The District Court erred by ruling that the government’s destruction of 
evidence did not undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Next, Walton contends that the government destroyed evidence, i.e., the 
surveillance tape from the Timmons Lane Post Office, which may have affected the 
jury‟s verdict.  There is no evidence that the government either withheld or destroyed 
potentially exculpatory evidence.  Further, there is no reasonable probability that the 
results of the proceeding would have been different had the surveillance videotape been 
preserved by the Timmons Lane Post Office.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 
(1995) (evidence is material under Brady where there is a reasonable probability that the 
result [the verdict] would have been different had the evidence been produced).  No such 
reasonable probability exists here.  There is no error.  
(4)  The District Court erred by ruling that the government had not acted in bad 
faith when it destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence.  
 
The government‟s failure to preserve evidence does not amount to a due process 
violation unless the government acted in bad faith.  Arizona v. Youngbood, 488 U.S. 51, 
58 (1988).  Based on the record before this Court, there is no indication that the 
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government acted in bad faith.  At the first Brady hearing,
10
 Inspector Thomas admitted 
that at trial, she had expressly denied reviewing any surveillance videotapes or knowing 
that surveillance videotapes even existed.  Later at the post-trial evidentiary hearing, 
Inspector Thomas corrected her previous misstatement, stating that the Timmons Lane 
Post Office did have a video surveillance system and that although she had requested the 
surveillance videotape of July 26, 2004, she neglected to review it until much later.  
When she did review the videotape, Inspector Thomas discovered that it was not the 
correct videotape (it was the June 26, 2004 videotape).  The District Court concluded 
that, at worst, the inspector “was negligent in failing to promptly review the videotape 
she received and for not requesting that the correct tape be sent.  There is no evidence of 
bad faith.”  (App. Vol. I, Part I, 25).  We agree with the District Court - - there is no error.   
(5) The District Court erred in ruling that the government’s failure to correct 
knowingly false trial testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
Walton‟s final Brady claim asserts that the District Court erred in determining that 
allowing Inspector Thomas‟s testimony did not amount to error.  Using a harmless error 
analysis, we find that: (1) Inspector Thomas‟s initial testimony, where she testified that 
there was no surveillance videotape monitoring system at the Timmons Lane Post Office, 
was false or mistaken; (2) Inspector Thomas made the statement during direct testimony 
at trial; (3) Inspector Thomas corrected her testimony during cross-examination at trial, 
                                                 
10
   Two evidentiary hearings were held.  The first hearing was held on 2/1/07 and the 
second hearing was held on 6/13/07.  The purpose of the second hearing was so that 
Walton could present additional evidence regarding the surveillance videotape. 
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acknowledging her mistake, and stating that she had confused this case with another she 
was working on; (4) Walton‟s counsel impeached Inspector Thomas during the post-trial 
Brady hearing, and pointed out the discrepancies in Inspector Thomas‟s testimony in his 
closing remarks at trial, for the benefit of the jury; (5) the mistake was not intentional; 
and (6) the government did not rely on Inspector Thomas‟s testimony in presenting its 
case.  There was enough evidence presented at trial to convict Walton without Inspector 
Thomas‟s testimony.  Inspector Thomas‟s testimony was cumulative and would not have 
affected the outcome of the trial or caused any substantial injury to Walton.  For these 
reasons, we find that any failure on the part of the government to correct Inspector 
Thomas‟s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jury Instructions 
Walton was found guilty of two counts of distribution of cocaine and aiding and 
abetting the distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 
18 U.S.C. § 2.  Walton‟s final claim was that the District Court erred by instructing the 
jury that it could convict on the distribution counts under a theory of aiding and abetting.  
Walton did not object to this instruction at trial, and for that reason, we review the 
District Court‟s Order for plain error.  United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 265 (3d Cir. 
2001).  In order to make a determination of plain error, “the first limitation on appellate 
authority under Rule 52(b) is that there indeed be an error.”  United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 732 (1993).  Next, the error must be “plain” and the third is that the error must 
“affect substantial rights.” Id. at 734.  “Even if these requirements are met, the court 
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should not exercise its discretion unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. at 736. 
In the indictment, Walton was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine, and two counts of distribution of cocaine and aiding and abetting the distribution 
of cocaine.  Because he was so charged, the District Court was correct to instruct the jury 
on the alternative standard of proof for a conviction on aiding and abetting the 
distribution of cocaine.  United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361, 1364-66 (10th Cir. 
1988) (“upon a fair reading of the indictment as a whole, the contested instruction 
regarding aiding and abetting did nothing more than reflect the allegations in the 
indictment.  It did not amend the indictment, and there was no variance in the proof.”)  
Therefore, we find no error in the District Court‟s instruction regarding the alternative 
theory of aiding and abetting. 
Walton also contends that the evidence did not support an aiding and abetting 
theory, as “the government failed to charge any person other than Appellant of a principal 
offense in the distribution counts, and under the evidence no person other than Appellant 
committed a principal offense.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 36).  We disagree.   
“In order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the 
defendant willfully and knowingly associate himself in some way with the crime, and that 
he willfully and knowingly seek by some act to help make the crime succeed.”  United 
States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 543 (3d Cir. 2002).  We “must determine whether the 
evidence submitted at trial, „when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 
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would allow a rational trier of fact to convict.‟”  United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 371 
(3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  Review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
conviction is “highly deferential.” Id. 
During trial, the government presented evidence that Walton employed Winfrey 
and possibly Bostic in the cocaine distribution.  In addition, although Walton contends 
that another person mailed the two packages of drugs from the Timmons Lane Post 
Office, the fact that Walton‟s fingerprints were found on the packages could lead a  jury 
to find that Walton aided and abetted that individual.  We find that there was more than 
enough evidence, including evidence linking Walton to Bostic and Winfrey and the fact 
that Walton‟s fingerprints were found on the packages, to indicate that at the very least, 
Walton aided and abetted someone in distributing the cocaine.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The District Court‟s denial of Walton‟s Batson challenges was proper.  The 
District Court did not err in its rulings regarding Walton‟s Brady claims.  The jury 
instructions on aiding and abetting were legally sufficient and appropriate.  We will 
affirm the District Court‟s Order.   
